INTRODUCTION
Regulatory and normative changes in international organizations have led to an increase of women in leadership positions, such as that of executive head of United Nations (UN) agencies (Haack 2014a ). However, while there are more women in UN leadership positions, there are notable differences between different types of organizations, especially between the UN funds and programs, and the UN specialized agencies. While women have occupied executive positions in all but one of the funds and programs since 1987, the seventeen UN specialized agencies have seen only four women leaders, with three women in office in 2014. How did women break the 'glass ceiling' (Wirth 2001) in these less conducive environments, convincing their electorate of their leadership potential? Differences can be accounted for in part by the nature of the appointment process and the nature of the organization's portfolio (Haack 2014b) : As the UN funds and programs are largely soft, female portfolios and the specialized agencies are masculine portfolios, more women can be found in the former than in the latter. Secondly, the UN SecretaryGeneral appoints executive heads in the funds and programs, while candidates for executive positions in the specialized agencies are elected by member states.
Appointments reduce the potential for conflict over the choice of candidates, while elections bring to the fore not only differences in understanding of gender roles but also (geo-)political interests and bargaining, potentially preventing women's access.
However, while the nature of portfolios and the appointment process sheds light on the likelihood of women to access a particular type of organization, it does not account for the conditions that actually enable access. Here, the literature points to crises and instability as important factors (Genovese 1993a , Hodson 1997 , Jalalzai 2008 ).
Historically crises have opened up unique windows of opportunity for women by offering an alternative to voters (here: member states) and clearly signaling change. In general, instability and crisis led to changes in leadership by forcing established leaders out in the hope that a new face will bring about change. This applies to candidates independent of gender as the cases of Wally N'Dow at UN-HABITAT and Jean-Pierre Hocke, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, shows.
In 1997 N'Dow was forced to quit over questions of misspent funds, while Hocke's use of First Class air travel during times of budget cuts, a privilege only afforded to the Secretary-General at the time, led to his resignation. However, while men may be elected independently of critical political circumstances, women are elected only in crisis situations. In other words, successful access to office takes place in the context of crisis. Yet, despite historic evidence for the role of crises in women's access to office (such as in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan etc.), Jalalzai (2013) finds little statistical correlation between crisis and access. This paradox is explained by DuerstLahti's (1997) concept of 're-gendering'. According to Duerst-Lahti, organizations become regendered or, more simply, women become more 'acceptable' over time as more women access organizations. Thus, over time the importance of crises for women's access may diminish.
In this paper I will investigate the limited number of cases where women have led one of the UN specialized agencies to understand how these findings can be translated from the context of democratic politics to international organizations.
Politically, an increase in the number of women in international organizations signals the potential for women to contribute go global governance, and models or incentivizes gender equality, especially to states where women's rights continue to be weak. Analytically, demystifying the process of accessing leadership roles in international organizations explains the long pipeline of women's success and engagement from the local to the global, as women politicians, activists and civil servants are appointed to international positions after they have established successful careers elsewhere. Here, I will show that successful women leaders who broke the glass ceiling i.e. who constituted the first generation of women leaders in a given organization, were elected in the context of organizational crisis. However, extending this I draw on Duerst-Lahti (1997) to show that second generation women executive heads can be successful in the absence of crises. First, I will revisit the literature on the role of political crisis in women's access to executive office and translate the concept of 'crisis' from the national domain to the international, defining 'crisis' as a crisis of legitimacy that derives from actual, potential and perceived organizational instability. Analyzing in turn the elections of Gro Harlem Brundtland to the World Health Organization (WHO), Irina Bokova to the United Nations Education, Science and Culture Organization (UNESCO), and Christine Lagarde to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), I will demonstrate that regional power politics are important factors in this context, as they may impact on the selection of women candidates. In other words, where crises do occur they have a uniquely international character as regional alliances and power political concerns overlap with questions of corruption, mismanagement and misconduct. Finally, analyzing Margaret Chan's election to the World Health Organization (WHO), I will show that once the glass ceiling has been broken, the second generation of women leaders can be successful in the absence of crisis.
CRISIS AND ACCESS TO EXECUTIVE OFFICE
Research studying women in politics highlights a variety of factors that influence women's pathways into political office, including the role of quotas (Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo 2012, Krook 2010) , qualifications and connections (SchwindtBayer 2011), the nature of the role and the nature of the political system (Duerst-Lahti 1997, Krook 2010, Jalalzai 2008) , the role of the media and its representation of candidates (Murray 2010) as well as normative changes in the political environment (Krook and True 2010) . However, in the context of the executive office Genovese (1993a) , Hodson (1997) and Jalalzai (2008) showed that successful women leaders were elected in the context of crises and situations of political instability. Where the state had become dominated by corruption, oppression and political turmoil women offered an attractive alternative to the electorate in which 'female qualities' or family legacies, or both, played a critical role. In most cases where women accessed executive office during political crisis, women candidates built on the political legacy of a deceased or assassinated male relative and former political leader. Thus, women were not only able to draw on the name recognition factor and organizational inheritance (i.e. financial and other resources) of the deceased male politician (Hodson 1997) but could also promise a return to more stable times, such as during their relative's rule. Women's candidature thus expressed a filial duty of a loving wife or daughter, extending an ideal of female qualities of innocence, nurturing and caring from family to nation. They thus created a positive counter image to the corruption, oppression and nepotism practiced by men, making women into a potential leader that is acceptable to voters even in male-dominated societies (Jalalzai and Krook 2010) . Alternatively, Ryan and Haslam argue (2007) , crisis situations may favor women because leadership positions become so precarious, i.e. subject to a greater likelihood of failure, that they become unattractive to men, thus creating 'glass cliffs'.
However, despite historic evidence of the importance of crises, Jalalzai (2013) found no statistical relevance for it. This finding may be the result of two factors: 1) the framing of the relationship, which states that all successful women were elected in the context of crisis, not that crises will lead to the election of women or a greater number of women, and 2) a disregard for changes over time. According to DuerstLahti (1997) organizations become regendered i.e. seen as more 'feminine' or more suitable for women once a woman has held the top job. Alternatively, women simply become more accepted as office-holders, showing that contextual circumstances may diminish over time, marking out different 'generations' of women leaders. For example, domestically the relationship between crisis, family and access tended to be strong in many of the cases of first generation of women leaders, yet recent research has shown that as more women are elected there is increasing variation in the extent to which political families matter (Thomas and Adams 2010) and the extent to which women play up (Thomas and Adams 2010) or down (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993, Dolan 2005 ) their gender.
As crises prove important contextual factors for women's access to office, facilitating a springboard from which to break the glass ceiling, how can these critical moments be measured and defined ? Seeger, Sellnow and Ulmer (1998, 233) define organizational crises as "a specific, unexpected, and non-routine event or series of events that create high levels of uncertainty and threaten or are perceived to threaten an organizations' high-priority goals". Domestically, the degree or severity of the crisis need not extend to the political turmoil witnessed in countries such as Pakistan or the Philippines. Crises can also affect organizations such as political parties, creating uncertainty that equally favors women to access executive positions. For example, Wiliarty (2008) found that German Chancellor Angela Merkel's election to office followed a period of instability within her party following electoral after 16 years in government. The subsequent resignation of party leader and previous Chancellor Helmut Kohl and an internal party finance scandal allowed Merkel to emerge as the main candidate. In a corporatist catch-all party, in which members organize around specific constituencies, Merkel, as a woman, an East German and Protestant in a majority male, Western German and Catholic party, signaled a new start for the CDU.
By contrast, crises in international organizations (IO) can be actual crises as well perceived and potential crises. Actual crises come into being following mismanagement, corruption, fraud and (costly) mistakes that may lead to unexpected outcomes, contributing to (or at least not preventing) conflict, death and starvation.
Examples of these crises can be found in the Oil-for-Food scandal, the failure to intervene in the Rwandan genocide and inappropriate or illegal behavior by peacekeepers (e.g. rape). Events such as these may undermine the IO's processes, output legitimacy or bureaucratic values. Moreover, they may become associated with a particular person, such as the UN Secretary-General, but more often tarnish the reputation of the organization in general, leading the public or member states to question the organization's usefulness. As such, crises in international organizations can emerge from potential or perceived threats to organizational goals and performance, making crises in IOs in the first instance crises of legitimacy.
Analysing multilateralism, Newman's (2007) reminds us that IOs only exist with the support and agreement of their member states, and that crises affect the fragile foundations of state support on which IOs are based. In emphasizing the need for state support, Newman's definition of crisis reflects the principles of the principalagent literature and its central practice of delegation (Hawkins et al. 2006a , Brown 2010 , while the organizational literature's focus on reputation (Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer 1998, Lange, Lee, and Dai 2011) hints at a solution to crises in IOs, be they of political or bureaucratic nature. While the principal-agent literature seeks to highlight how and why agency slack occurs, enabling agents (IOs) to act beyond their delegated powers, it also highlights that agency can be withdrawn if the organization does not fulfill its task as envisaged. In this context the organization's reputation is important insofar as IOs rely on member states' belief that the organization will fulfill shared needs (for cooperation), transparently, effectively and in the interest of member states.
Where an organization's reputation is questioned, member states' support may weaken or be withdrawn (Hawkins et al. 2006b ), as could be seen in the 1970s and 1980s in processes that have been described as 'politicization' (see Imber 1989 , Dutt 1995 .
In contrast to crises emerging from mismanagement and corruption, politicization relates to the deliberate use of the organization as a tool to pursue specific agendas, in particular where those agendas run counter to the largest UN contributors, the United States and European member states. Politicization occurred primarily in the UN specialized agencies due to different expectations of the organization and the appropriate provision of public goods. While developed states believed that specialized agencies are mainly functional organization, solving problems of underdevelopment through economic and technical transfer, developing states saw the specialized agencies as political platforms to raise broader questions of political, economic and social justice, thus shifting the debate from cooperation and standardization to the restructuring of international relations and the global economy (Williams 1987) . At the same time as developing countries used UN agencies to grow their own power globally, socialist states sought to use the same for an extension of class struggle (Beigbeder 1987) , while Arab states sought to concertedly deal with Israel (Dutt 1995) . In trying to achieve their respective aims, member states used a variety of strategies that ultimately unsettled and destabilized organizations, creating uncertainty as to their future functioning (Ghebali 1985) . (Genovese 1993b , Hodson 1997 , Jalalzai 2008 . While a large-n study may demonstrate what happens to women candidates in the absence of crisis by focusing on the difference between successful and unsuccessful candidates, this study focuses on successful women candidates, highlighting differences between those who broke the glass ceiling (first generation) and those that followed (second generation). Generally, this study seeks to explore and illustrate how election processes in international organizations play out. In doing so, this analysis highlights a range of related issues of importance for women candidates, such as media portrayals of women candidates (Murray 2010 organizational portfolios with global reach), roles with operational responsibility, and appointment processes that are subject to elections by member states. This excludes regional organizations such as the African Union and the Colombo Plan, as well as regional commissions within the UN system. Also excluded are international judges, special representatives and envoys, who lack operational responsibilities. Despite operational responsibilities, decision-making power and global portfolios, women who lead UN departments are excluded from the study as they report directly to the UN Secretary-General. Finally, the focus is on women in the UN specialized agencies as they, unlike their counterparts in regional organizations, face a global and therefore heterogeneous electorate, which translates into similar patterns of recognition for gender equality as well as similar (geo-)political interests that frame the election process.
The position of executive head in international organizations is of dual nature:
professional-bureaucratic as well as political. This is also expressed in the selection process. Unlike in electoral politics, where a minimum age and nationality circumscribe eligibility to elected positions, candidates for the role of executive heads in UN agencies are subject to criteria more closely resembling those of professional job descriptions. While most candidates are national of member states, other nationals These procedures are complemented by political processes, which make the election of candidates in international organizations more comparable to electoral politics than to the hiring of board members or CEOs in the private sector. First, once a vacancy is announced, candidatures are invited. Candidates rarely, if ever, nominate themselves but are put forward by member states (mostly but not exclusively their own nationals). Candidates then engage in 'campaigns', which involve visiting member states from which they seek to gain support. During this process some candidates may drop out if support seems unlikely. Once the deadline for nominations has been reached and any unsuitable candidates eliminated, secret ballots will to determine the successful candidate. The WHO Executive Board determines the shortlist of five candidates through secret elections in which each of the 34 Board members may list five preferred candidate. Shortlisted candidates are interviewed. This is followed by secret ballot in which only one candidate may be chosen.
Repeated rounds of voting, at the end of which the candidate with the lowest vote is eliminated, determine the final choice (WHO 2011) . By contrast, the IMF's 24-member Executive Board draws up a shortlist of three candidates, which will be followed by meetings with the candidates. The IMF insists that "although the Executive Board may select a Managing Director by a majority of the votes cast, the objective of the Executive Board is to select the Managing Director by consensus" (IMF 2014) . Voting, including the drawing up of the shortlist, takes into account the IMF's weighted voting system, which gives more votes to larger economies.
Following a 'gentleman's agreement', previous IMF candidates have all been European, while US citizens lead the World Bank. By contrast, UNESCO's selection process is highly secretive: the 58 member Executive Board receives nominations confidentially, the Board's meeting is held in private and the ballot is secret.
Candidates need to achieve an absolute majority in five possible rounds of voting, followed by a secret ballot in the General Assembly to approve the Board's nominated candidate (UNESCO 2010). The process' secrecy highlights how critical the election of Irina Bokova was, as it was broadly covered in the news. 
BREAKING THE GLASS CEILING
In the UN specialized agencies crises afforded women unique opportunities to access executive office. This was facilitated by an election process in which executive heads are elected directly by member states (i.e. by limited membership executive boards) and not appointed solely by the Secretary-General, as is the case with other senior appointments in the UN system. Candidates take part in small election campaigns in which they seek to secure the support of a number of member states, covering a sufficiently large geographic range of states. While the principle of regional rotation for executive positions exists as a gentleman's agreement, regional interests, regional allegiances and vote jockeying all play a part in the election process, also potentially opening up opportunities for crises. Thus, candidates have been considered "highly political animals" (Williams 1987 ), more concerned with their majority support, which does not necessarily correspond to the largest contributors. Women candidates thus benefit from both organizational crises that can be addressed by their unique qualities, as well as the dynamics of geopolitical power politics.
Gro Harlem Brundtland (WHO, 1998 -2003 The election of Gro Harlem Brundtland (Norway) to the position of World Health
Organization (WHO) Director-General in 1998 mirrors the crisis theory very closely.
As the WHO prepared for its fiftieth anniversary in 1998, the organization showed "symptoms of a dying organization" (Edwards 1997) . The leadership of DirectorGeneral Hiroshi Nakajima (Japan) had left the organization in a state of instability, with low morale across the organization and its staff, a bloated bureaucracy that was larger at the center than in the field, financial mismanagement and consequently disillusionment among member states. Nakajima was accused of cronyism, racism against African states and 'misplaced budget priorities' (Freedman 1998) . Nakajima had made personal enemies both inside and outside the organization, with poor English and French language skills contributing to this lack of support. The United
States were indeed strongly opposed to Nakajima (he was said to have kept his job primarily because of Japanese support) (Edwards 1997) , amplifying instability and uncertainty about WHO's future, which opened up as a result. In the context of this organizational crisis opportunities opened up for women candidates to compete and succeed in accessing WHO executive leadership.
In April 1997 Nakajima announced that he would not run for a third term.
After a six-month campaign period, elections for a new Director-General were to be held from 19-28 January. Seven candidates emerged, of which one soon withdrew:
Fernando Antezana (Bolivia), Nakajima's deputy, withdrew his bid for the DirectorGeneralship after the American network CBS alleged on its program "60 minutes" (Crossette 1998 ).
In the first round of secret balloting no clear loser emerged. In the second round Samba then scored the fewest votes, while Sadik, who had been very confident about her candidacy and was considered Brundtland's 'toughest competitor', was eliminated in the third round (Crossette 1998 , Freedman 1998 . Despite her strong position, Sadik was said to have suffered from a split in the Asian vote, while
Brundtland could gain the support of a broad range of regional support. Indeed, the United States, although due to regional rotation not on the Executive Board, supported Brundtland's candidacy. As the largest contributor to the WHO budget (25%), the US endorsement was an important one. Thus, in the fourth round of voting, Brundtland won 18 of the 17 required votes, with Alleyne winning ten and Uton winning four votes (Kaban 1998) .
At the beginning of the voting process, Boyer (1998) Altman (1998) , as the daughter of a political physician and a cabinet minister, her path from medicine to politics was a 'natural' one. To Brundtland health was political and she had called for doctors to participate more in politics, stating that those with knowledge of science should make health politics. Despite not being without controversy herself -her call for the right to abortion had in the past angered both
Muslims and Catholics -she had a reputation as a strong diplomat and politician. She Indeed, Nakajima's leadership was so unpopular among WHO staff that on hearing of Brundtland's election, WHO professional staff emerged from their offices and cheered. Although Alleyne had also been successful as a reformer, Brundtland was seen by member states as the candidate most likely to reform the organization overall (Brown 1998 , Brundtland 2002 . During her election campaign Brundtland would often find support by not even mentioning her campaign, let alone her gender and her potential as a woman candidate. Instead, she focused on discussing health issues affecting the countries she visited, the importance of global public health and the importance of the WHO in addressing these issues (Brundtland 2002 ). On her election
Brundtland thus stated that her first priority would be to attend to internal reforms and shift attention to health issues in developing countries, making a clear move away from her predecessor's policies and actions. Brundtland did not seek re-election after one term and was succeeded by Lee Jong-wook (South Korea) in 2003.
Irina Bokova (UNESCO, 2009-)
Irina Bokova's election to the position of UNESCO Executive Director was an example of the kind of politicization that had affected the organization in the past.
More than any other UN agency, UNESCO has been the battleground for ideological and cultural conflicts -perhaps unsurprising given its remit in education, culture, science and world heritage. UNESCO has at its heart the question of identity and the liberal internationalist ideals of peace through understanding and cooperation. With such 'soft' foundations and no 'hard' sanctions, UNESCO's politicization was seen by many as being part and parcel of international cooperation in this field (Lyons, Baldwin, and McNemar 1977, Dutt 1995) . In the past this has, as described above, led to considerable organizational instability as members accused each other not only of trying to erode liberal principles, e.g. through the promotion of the New International Communication Order, but also of using UNESCO for polemics and propaganda by systematically inserting extraneous issues on the agenda or forcing through resolutions of normative content (Ghebali 1985 While all women candidates performed better than the majority of male candidates, with the exception of Hosny and Yakovenko, the association of both men with scandal and improper behavior meant that women candidates could benefit at each stage of elimination. Moreover, regional alliances were played out through the withdrawal of certain candidates in order to enhance the chances of Bokova over Hosny, with African and Asian countries citing Hosny's 'poor English' as an important reason for not voting for him (Sharma 2009) . However, at the heart of the crisis that afforded Bokova access to leadership were Hosny's remarks that had the potential to cause future crisis and uncertainty within an organization that has suffered from politicization in the past. Unlike on previous occasions that concerned issue relating to Israel and Judaism, the controversy surrounding Hosny's remarks was related to the fact that this was not a broad challenge to the legitimacy of Israel's participation in UNESCO or the existence of the Israeli state, but that it directly challenged UNESCO's mission: culture. It thus politicized not only the question of the equality of cultures but also demonstrated Hosny's views on the treatment of cultural products; leading Flamini (2009) to wryly note: "Book burning is not exactly a suitable sentiment in a candidate with ambitions to direct global efforts to further culture, science, education, climate change, women's rights, as well as preserving world heritage". It is perhaps ironic then that in contrast to its allies in Europe and the US, Israel dropped its opposition to Hosny as it was said to have struck a deal with Egypt on security cooperation in Gaza (Daly 2009 ).
Christine Lagarde (IMF, 2011-) In Christine Lagarde's case the existence of both internal organizational crisis and external crisis, i.e. the global financial crisis with focus in Europe, opened up a window of opportunity for Lagarde's access to executive office. Choosing Lagarde served the two purposes of providing an alternative to the male incumbent and maintaining regional, here European, control. Voting for the position of MD followed the voting share patterns used across the IMF. With 16.7% the US holds the largest share of votes, followed by Japan with 6% and European countries collectively holding 30%. However, while a majority of 85% is required on all issues, including the election of the MD, the Executive Board "an almost surreal aura of veneration. This is combined with a nuanced command of English, a precise intellect and unnerving stamina. People talk about Lagarde with admiration that borders on hero worship. She 'radiates charm', she 'oozes respect'; she's described variously as intelligent, beautiful, upstanding and elegant. In short, they usually conclude, Elle a de la classe ('she's got class')" (Guiness 2010 ).
Indeed, references to her appearance were common. Commentators noted her elegance, expressed in her white hair, her tan, her tall, slim figure and her 'impeccable dress'. Importantly, commentators noted she lived a rather 'un-French' lifestyle:
Lagarde is a vegetarian and does not drink alcohol. As a teenager she was a member of the French national synchronized swimming team and still swims, cycles and goes to the gym every day (Gavaghan 2011 , Guiness 2010 ).
According to Murray (2010) , the appearance of women in politics receives disproportionally more attention by the media than male candidates. Murray notes that his undermines the substantive message of women candidates, framing them as sexual and visual rather than powerful and intellectual. However, the attention paid to Crisis and Lagarde's image and qualities as a professional woman played a significant role in this breakdown of gender barriers.
STEPPING OVER GLASS SHARDS: THE SECOND GENERATION
Given the small number of women elected to the UN specialized agencies, only tentative conclusions can be drawn as to how and why women are elected after an agency has had a woman leader. Thus far only the World Health Organization has had two women leaders and a first glance at the 'second generation' suggests that organizational crisis may be less important in this. This is consistent with DuerstLahti's (1997) finding that once an office has had a woman leader it becomes regendered as feminine or creates greater acceptance for the possibility of a future woman leader. However, regional alliances and geo-political power politics may have had the knowledge and know-how of how to lead an organization but lacked experience in negotiating a diplomatic path between member states' interests.
In conclusion, while women may still have glass ceilings to break in a number of international organizations, the presence of women in high-profile organizations such as the IMF, repeated election to organizations in the (male) science area and the general improvement in the number of women candidates suggests that women executive leaders will no longer be an exception in future but become the norm in organizations that value and promote diversity.
